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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the Early Warning System (EWS) for the control of the respect of 
the principle of subsidiarity by national parliaments was activated for the 
third time. 14 parliamentary chambers1 totalling 22 votes had informed the 
European Commission (the Commission) by 10 May 2016 that they 
considered its Proposal for a Directive concerning the posting of workers in 
the framework of the provision of services2 (hereafter: the PWD or the 
Directive) to be in breach of the principle of subsidiarity.  
The right for national parliaments to control the respect of the principle of 
subsidiarity of new European Union (EU) legislative proposals,3 when the EU 
has no exclusive competence, was granted to them by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Since 2009, national parliaments each have two votes in the framework of the 
EWS; in bicameral systems, each chamber has one vote.4 If the reasoned 
opinions forwarded by national parliaments to the European Commission 
                                                 
1 With the number of votes in brackets: Romanian Chamber of Deputies (1), 
Romanian Senate (1), Czech Chamber of Deputies (1), Czech Senate (1), Polish 
Sejm (1), Polish Senate (1), Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2), Danish 
Parliament (2), Croatian Parliament (2), Latvian Saeima (2) Bulgarian National 
Assembly (2), Hungarian National Assembly (2), Estonian Parliament (2) and the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic (2). 
2 Proposal for Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services, COM(2016) 128 final.  
3 This means that national parliaments cannot review existing legislation unless a 
proposal for its amendment is presented. 
4 Articles 6 and 7 Protocol No. 2 annexed to the Consolidated versions of the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[2016] OJ C 202/C1 (‘the Treaties’) 
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within the eight weeks following the transmission of an EU legislative 
proposal amount to one third of the total number of votes – one fourth in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – this triggers a 'yellow card'.5 If this 
total amounts to half of the total number of votes, it is an 'orange card'.6 The 
Commission has not received an orange card yet.  
This article aims at analysing the third yellow card triggered in 2016. In 
particular, it highlights the dynamics of interparliamentary cooperation 
which allowed the threshold to be reached. Special attention is further 
devoted to the East-West divide that came up in relation to the issue of 
Posting Workers. We contend that the Juncker Commission's attitude is 
similar to the one adopted by the Barroso Commission after national 
parliaments had triggered the second yellow card. The Barroso Commission 
did not want to change its proposal for political reasons and unless it 
concludes to have committed a subsidiarity breach, the Commission's hands 
are tied by the letter of the Treaty and the Commission may not modify a 
legislative proposal for other reasons after the EWS has been activated.  
This article is structured as follows. The next section provides an analysis of 
the previous two yellow cards (II). Then the background and the content of 
the proposal for a revision of the PWD (III), as well as the dynamics of 
interparliamentary cooperation between national parliaments to activate the 
EWS are examined (IV). Building on this assessment, this article looks at the 
actual content of the reasoned opinions (V). Subsequently, the ongoing 
legislative process, i.e. what has happened since the yellow card was triggered, 
is described (VI). The final part draws some conclusions and discusses the 
effects that the third yellow card may have on the future role of national 
parliaments in the EU (VII). 
                                                 
5 Article 7(1) Protocol No. 2 annexed to the Treaties.  
6 Article 7(3) Protocol No. 2 annexed to the Treaties.  
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II. COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS YELLOW CARDS 
The third yellow card, on the PWD, was preceded by two other yellow cards: 
in 2012 on the 'Monti II' proposal7 and in 2013 on the European Public 
Prosecutor's Office proposal (EPPO).8  
The first yellow card, triggered in 2012, concerned the ‘Monti II’ Proposal for 
a Council Regulation. The proposal aimed at 'lay[ing] down the general 
principles and rules applicable at Union level with respect to the exercise of 
the fundamental right to take collective action within the context of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services' (Article 1(1)). 
This proposal was particularly short (five articles only) and it was heavily 
criticised by national parliaments for failing to demonstrate the existence of 
any added value of action at EU level, for lacking proper justification, and for 
the choice of the legal basis that supposedly allowed the Commission to take 
action in this domain – although national parliaments mentioned other 
arguments unrelated to subsidiarity, their main points of criticism strictly 
focused on subsidiarity.9  
                                                 
7 Proposal for a Council regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective 
action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services, COM(2012) 130. 
8 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the European Public Prosecutor's Office, 
COM(2013) 534.  
9 Indeed, if the Commission has no competence to act in the first place, there cannot 
be any question of subsidiarity, as this principle applies in the domain of non-
exclusive EU competences. See for more details on the arguments raised by 
national parliaments, the context and content of this proposal: Federico Fabbrini 
and Katarzyna Granat, ''Yellow Card, but no Foul': The Role of the National 
Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an 
EU Regulation on the Right to Strike' (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 115; 
Diane Fromage, Les Parlements dans l'Union Européenne après le Traité de Lisbonne. La 
participation des Parlements Allemands, Britanniques, Espagnols Français et Italiens 
(L'Harmattan 2015) 359f; and Marco Goldoni, 'The Early Warning System and the 
Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Political Interpretation' (2014) 10 European 
Constitutional Law Review 90. All reasoned opinions are available on the Platform 
for EU interparliamentary exchange (IPEX) <http://www.ipex.eu> accessed 2 April 
2017.  
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The proposal was made on the basis of the flexibility clause (Article 352 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) whose usage the 
Commission justified as follows: 'Article 352 TFEU (reserved for cases where 
the Treaties do not provide the necessary powers to implement actions 
necessary, under the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the 
objectives of the Treaties) is the appropriate legal basis for the proposed 
measure'.10 The Commission did not see any contradiction with the clear 
prohibition contained in Article 153(5) TFEU which reads: 'The provisions of 
this Article [Art. 153] shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right 
to strike or the right to impose lock-outs'. In its view, the fact that the Court 
has issued rulings on this matter shows that collective actions cannot be 
deemed to remain outside of the scope of EU law.11 The Viking Line and Laval 
rulings12 had indeed already encroached upon the prohibition contained in 
Article 153(5) TFEU. In Laval, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) was asked to answer the question whether a strike that violated the 
freedom of services was allowed; the Court replied that this was not the case 
since the object of the strike was to demand acceptance of wages higher than 
set by the systems allowed in the PWD. Hence, the Court in this judgment 
adopted a new approach by considering, among other things, the minimum 
pay level in the host State as a ceiling, thus implying that host States could not 
apply higher terms and conditions of employment to workers than the 
minimum levels.13 This decision gave rise to significant criticism and critical 
comments, in particular by trade unions and academics.14 In an attempt to 
                                                 
10 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective 
action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services, COM(2012) 130, 10. 
11 Ibid 11. 
12 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers' Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union 
v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti EU:C:2007:772 and Case C-341/05 Laval 
un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetare-
förbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet EU:C:2007:809, 
respectively.  
13 Claire Kilpatrick, 'Laval's Regulatory Conundrum: Collective Standard-Setting 
and the Court's New Approach to Posted Workers' (2009) 34 European Law 
Review 6, 844 and 848. 
14 Among these many sources, for instance: Anne Davies, 'One Step Forward, Two 
Steps Back? Laval and Viking at the ECJ' (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 126; Mark 
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respond, in 2012 the Commission proposed an Enforcement Directive15 and 
a Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action in the 
context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services 
(the 'Monti II' Regulation object of the second yellow card). Despite the 
Laval and Viking judgements, it is still hard to imagine that the Commission 
may be authorised to propose measures such as the Regulation in question on 
the basis of this sole justification. As a matter of fact, 7 (out of 12) 
parliamentary chambers/parliaments16 were of the opinion either that the 
Commission lacked the competence to make the proposal at stake, or that 
Article 352 TFEU was not an appropriate legal basis. For what concerns the 
respect of the principle of subsidiarity more specifically, the justification the 
Commission provided is particularly short, as it simply contended that 'the 
objective of the Regulation, to clarify the general principles and EU rules 
applicable to the exercise of the fundamental right to take industrial action 
within the context of the freedom to provide services and the freedom of 
establishment, including the need to reconcile them in practice in cross-
border situations, requires action at European Union level and cannot be achieved 
by the Member States alone'.17  
The Commission undoubtedly failed to fulfil its obligation to justify its 
respect of the principle of subsidiarity in a detailed statement as prescribed 
                                                 
Freeland and Jeremias Prassl, Viking, Laval and Beyond (Hart 2014); Kilpatrick (n 
13); Norbert Reich, 'Free Movement v Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – the 
Laval and Viking Cases Before the ECJ' (2008) German Law Journal 125; Also, many 
press releases by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) available at: 
<https://www.etuc.org/issue/posting-workers?type=All&field_document_type_tid 
=All> accessed 2 April 2017. 
15 Directive 2014/67/EU on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal 
Market Information System ('the IMI Regulation') [2014] OJ L159/57. 
16 Dutch House of Representatives, Portuguese Assembly, Luxembourgish Chamber 
of Deputies, Latvian Parliament, French Senate, German Bundesrat, Belgian 
House of Representatives. 
17 Proposal for a Council regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective 
action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services, COM(2012) 130, 11 (emphasis added). 
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by Article 5 Protocol No. 2.18 It also clearly did not show how it took into due 
consideration the two criteria laid down by Article 5(2) Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU) to assess the respect of the principle of subsidiarity: 
the fact that the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved at Member 
State level while simultaneously being better achieved at Union level. Almost 
4 months after 12 national parliaments amounting to a total of 19 votes had 
raised the first yellow card ever, on 12 September 2012 the Commission 
announced its intention to withdraw its proposal, although it still did not 
consider that there had been any breach of the subsidiarity principle.19 
After the second yellow card had been triggered in 2013, the Commission 
decided to maintain its proposal in its original form.20 This second yellow 
card concerned the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the European 
Public Prosecutor's Office and it was raised following the issuance of 
reasoned opinions by 14 national parliaments representing a total of 18 
votes.21 In this case, there was no doubt that the Commission had the 
competence to make such a proposal since Article 86(1) TFEU reads: 'In 
order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, the 
Council […] may establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office from 
Eurojust'. However, as was also the case when the first yellow card was 
                                                 
18  Art 5 Protocol 2 annexed to the Treaties: 'Draft legislative acts shall be justified 
with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Any draft 
legislative act should contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise 
compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This statement 
should contain some assessment of the proposal's financial impact and, in the case 
of a directive, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by Member States, 
including, where necessary, the regional legislation. The reasons for concluding 
that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by 
qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators' (emphasis added). 
19 European Commission, Commission Decision to withdraw the Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the 
context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, 
COM(2012) 130. 
20 See on this second yellow card: Diane Fromage, 'The Second Yellow Card on the 
EPPO Proposal: An Encouraging Development for Member States Parliaments?' 
(2015) 35 Yearbook of European Law 1, 5. 
21 As stated above, in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the threshold to 
trigger a yellow card has been lowered to one fourth of the total number of votes.  
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triggered as described above, the justification provided by the Commission 
fell short of showing clearly why it considered that the principle of 
subsidiarity had been duly respected. Whereas the impact assessment was 
very detailed, the justification contained in the proposal itself did not go into 
much detail as it was limited to the following statements: 'There is a need for 
the Union to act because the foreseen action has an intrinsic Union 
dimension'22 and 'this objective can only be achieved at Union level by reason 
of its scale and effects [given that ..] the present situation, in which the 
prosecution of offences against the Union's financial interests is exclusively 
in the hands of the authorities of the Member States is not satisfactory and 
does not sufficiently achieve the objective of fighting effectively against 
offences affecting the Union budget'.23 Consequently, in this case there also 
appears to have been a breach by the Commission of its obligation of 
justification contained in Article 5 Protocol No. 2; this breach is visible in the 
fact that alternative scenarios, such as the possible reinforcement of OLAF, 
were not considered.24  
With the exception of the French Senate and the Irish Oireachtas, all 
parliamentary chambers raised subsidiarity-related issues in their reasoned 
opinions, i.e. they did not make improper use of the EWS to show their 
overall opposition, even if some of them also raised non-subsidiarity related 
matters. Still, some chambers (Cypriot House of Representatives, Swedish 
Parliament) considered both proportionality and subsidiarity in their 
assessments, even if the EWS solely encompasses the latter. In any case, on 
that occasion the effects of the yellow card were different: in the outcome of 
the Commission's review in itself and in the speed with which it was 
produced, but also in the way in which the relationship between the 
Commission and national parliaments evolved.  
The Commission's decision to maintain its proposal in its original form was 
published only three weeks after the yellow card had been triggered. Later on, 
differently from what it had done when the first yellow card was triggered, it 
wrote individual replies to each chamber that had submitted a reasoned 
                                                 
22 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the European Public Prosecutor's Office, 
COM(2013) 534, 4.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Fromage (n 20). 
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opinion.25 Interestingly, some of the national parliaments and the 
Commission subsequently entered into a sort of dialogue and some national 
parliaments submitted a second and even a third contribution. It may 
therefore be said that the Commission's attitude vis-à-vis national 
parliaments was more open in that it showed a certain readiness to 
thoroughly consider parliaments' opinions and to discuss the issue with them.  
Against this background, it appears that the circumstances under which 
these two first cards were shown to the Commission are very different from 
the third card analysed here. The differences between the three yellow cards 
are not necessarily visible in the outcome of the procedure, since, in the 
present case as in that of the EPPO proposal, the Commission decided to 
maintain its proposal as it had presented it initially. By contrast, on the first 
occasion it decided to simply withdraw its proposal. The third yellow card is 
also different because in 2014, when it entered into office, the new 
Commission (the addressee of the yellow card) had made a clearer 
commitment to taking into account national parliaments' views than its 
predecessor: Jean-Claude Juncker promised to forge a 'new partnership'26 
with national parliaments. In addition, the constellation that triggered the 
third yellow card highlights an East-West divide: ten out of the eleven 
Member States whose parliamentary chambers issued reasoned opinions are 
located in Central and Eastern Europe.27 Finally, the division goes beyond the 
question of respecting the subsidiarity principle which, as shown below, was 
used as an instrument to express an overall opposition to the 'Social Europe' 
agenda that the Juncker Commission has presented. Interestingly, both the 
first and the third yellow card relate to the question of social rights in the 
European Union and were issued on legislative proposals submitted after the 
controversial Laval case.28 
                                                 
25 All these replies are available on the Commission's website: <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm> accessed 2 
April 2017.  
26 Jean-Claude Juncker, Mission Letter to First Vice-President Frans Timmermans 
(European Commission, 1 November 2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/archives/juncker 
-commission/docs/timmermans_en.pdf> accessed 2 April 2017. 
27 Only Denmark is an exception.  
28 Case C-341/05 Laval (n 12). 
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III. BACKGROUND AND CONTENT OF THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL 
FOR THE REVISION OF THE PWD 
This section deals more specifically with the third yellow card: it examines 
the highly controversial issue of the Posting of Workers (despite a marginal 
importance in numerical terms) and it considers the content of the 
Commission's proposal in detail.  
1. A Highly Controversial Issue Despite Its Marginal (Numerical) Significance 
Contrary to the legislative proposals which gave rise to the first and second 
yellow cards, the PWD aims at amending an existing directive and therefore 
is not a new piece of legislation. The issue of posted workers 'plays an 
essential role in the Internal Market'29 and allows companies to (temporarily) 
post workers in another Member State to provide a service. In the case of 
posted workers, to whom the norms relating to the provision of services and 
not those to the free movement of workers apply, it is necessary to determine 
which of the host State labour laws applies.  
The Directive covers three different forms of posting: 'the direct provision 
of services between two companies under a service contract, posting in the 
context of an establishment or company belonging to the same group ('intra-
group posting'), and posting through hiring out a worker via a temporary 
work agency established in another Member State'.30 Actually, the issue of 
posted workers has been controversial for a long time,31 and more acutely so 
                                                 
29 European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending 
Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services, SWD(2016) 53 final, 5. 
30 Ibid 5-6. 
31 Controversies were already visible when the Directive was adopted in 1996. 
Werner Eichhorst, 'European social policy between national and supranational 
regulation: Posted workers in the framework of liberalised services provision' 
[1998] MPIfG discussion paper 98/6, 5f. Also, previous attempts at adopting rules 
in this field at EU level had failed in the past, notably in the 1970s. On this historical 
development and how some issues that arose at the time can still be recognized in 
the PWD: Stein Evju, 'Revisiting the Posted Workers Directive: Conflict of Law 
and Laws in Contrast' (2009-2010) 12 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies 151. 
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since the 2004 EU enlargement which increased the gap between the highest 
and the lowest wages among Member States,32 and numerous academic 
articles and studies have echoed this controversy.33 As stated above, the 
CJEU's Laval34 decision constituted a clear illustration of the difficult 
reconciliation between the two objectives pursued by the Directive, namely 
that of the encouragement of the provision of services within the internal 
market and that of the protection of the rights of workers.35 Laval also 
represented the turning point towards a strict interpretation of the Directive 
by the CJEU subsequently visible in the cases that followed – Commission v. 
Luxembourg and Rüffert.36 This concern additionally arose again in a similar 
case, Sähköalojen ammattiliitoo ry37 in 2015, where some Polish workers posted 
in Finland had not received the minimum pay established by the Finnish 
                                                 
32  On this gap, which grew from 1:3 to 1:10 between 1996 and 2016: European 
Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29), 13. On the other hand, France for instance 
has long been advocating a stricter regime and was actively involved in the debate 
on the previous revision of the Directive launched in 2012 by the Commission. 
Cécile Barbière, 'La France part en guerre contre les travailleurs low cost' 
(Euractiv.fr, 5 November 2013) <http://www.euractiv.fr/section/europe-sociale-
emploi/news/la-france-part-en-guerre-contre-les-travailleurs-europeens-low-
cost/> accessed 2 April 2017; French Senate, Résolution européenne sur les normes 
européennes en matière de détachement des travailleurs, 16.10.2013 and French 
National Assembly, Résolution européenne sur la proposition de directive relative 
à l'exécution de la directive sur le détachement des travailleurs, 11 July 2013.  
33 See n 14. 
34 Claire Dhéret and Andreia Ghimis, 'The revision of the Posted Workers Directive: 
towards a sufficient policy adjustment?' European Policy Centre discussion paper, 
20 April 2016, 6-7 <http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=17&pub_id=6475> 
accessed 2 April 2017. 
35 The choice of the legal basis for this Directive, namely Articles 53 and 62 TFEU on 
the provision of services and the right to establishment, nevertheless shows that 
this is the primary aim of the Directive, ie not in the social protection of workers. 
On this predominance of the economic over the social dimension, also: Evju (n 31) 
154. 
36 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg EU:C:2008:350 and Case C-346/06 Dirk 
Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen EU:C:2008:189. On this development in case law: 
Kilpatrick (n 13) 848-850. 
37 Case C-396/13 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry contre Elektrobudowa Spółka Akcyjna 
EU:C:2015:86.  
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collective agreement.38 The issue of posted workers has therefore recurrently 
and frequently been examined by the CJEU in the past ten years. It is 
unsurprising that such controversies arise, as the text of the Directive finally 
adopted in 1996 after five years of hard intergovernmental negotiations 
constituted an '"umbrella" regulation which w[ould] safeguard national 
autonomy, but w[ould] not put an end to regime competition in the Single 
European Market'.39 In addition, some have argued that 'clear(er) definitions 
of posting and posted worker are necessary'.40 
Evidence shows that the number of posted workers has increased sharply in 
recent years41 – by 44.4% between 2010 and 2014 – which explains why the 
European Commission and some Member States felt the need to revise the 
existing legislation. Numerous abuses in the form of, among other things, 
false self-employment or 'letter box companies' also called for a revision of 
the PWD.42 The countries that have the highest numbers of workers posted 
to other EU Member States in absolute terms are France, Germany and 
Poland.43 Taking into account the actual size of the Member States' labour 
markets, the Member States that proportionally have the largest number of 
posted workers are Luxembourg, Slovenia and Slovakia.44 
Despite its highly controversial character, as illustrated not only by the yellow 
card but also by France's threat to suspend EU legislation on posted workers 
in July 201645 and by the introduction of the 'clause Molière' that requires 
                                                 
38 On this case: Rebecca Zahn, 'Revision of the Posted Workers' Directive: Equality 
at Last?' [2016] Working Paper Centre of European and Transnational Legal 
Studies Belfast 6 <http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/58911/1/Zahn_CETLS_2016_ 
Revision _of_the_posted_workers_directive.pdf> accessed 2 April 2017.  
39 Eichhorst (n 31) 30. 
40 Aukje van Hoek and Mijke Houwerzijl, ''Posting' and 'Posted Workers': The Need 
for Clear Definitions of Two Key Concepts of the Posting of Workers Directive' 
(2011-2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 419, 439. 
41 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29) 6.  
42 On these instances of abuse: Dhéret and Ghimis (n 34) 6-7. 
43 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29) 7. 
44 Ibid. 
45 'La France pourrait ne plus appliquer la directive sur les travailleurs détachés' 
(Euractiv.fr, 4 July 2016) <http://www.euractiv.fr/section/justice-affaires-
interieures/news/la-france-pourrait-ne-plus-appliquer-la-directive-sur-les-
travailleurs-detaches/> accessed 2 April 2017.  
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French to be the language spoken on construction sites financed by the State 
in some French regions,46 the phenomenon of posted workers is actually very 
limited in scale. It only concerns 0.7% of the total of EU workers, 0.4% of 
whom are unique posted workers,47 which means that only 0.3% of the EU 
workforce is recurrently posted. Yet, these figures hide important 
differences between sectors, as the construction sector for instance heavily 
relies on posted workers – hence the introduction of the 'clause Molière' in 
France – whereas other sectors are much less affected. But then again, the 
impression is often conveyed that posted workers are unskilled workers 
whereas actually 10.3 % of them are highly skilled.48 It is also commonly 
assumed that posted workers come from 'new' Member States whereas in 
France and Belgium for example the majority of posted workers come from 
'old' Member States.49 As stated by the Commission, 'strong data limitations 
on posting of workers remain an on-going problem'.50 In any event, it is 
certainly not true that all posted workers are Romanian builders or Polish 
plumbers. The wage gap observable for labour-intensive jobs, such as in the 
construction sector or in road transport, is much higher than that existing in 
high-end services sectors though.51 This is because the difference in costs 
between a local and a posted worker plays a more important role in the 
labour-intensive sectors and often constitutes a key incentive in the decision 
to post workers, whereas in the high-end services sector the cost has a more 
                                                 
46 For example, in the Hauts-de-France and Normandy regions. 'Marchés publics: la 
Normandie exige le français sur les chantiers', Le Parisien (Paris, 23 November 2016) 
and Valerie Sauvage, 'Une «clause Molière» pour faire parler français sur les 
chantiers du conseil régional', La Voix du Nord (27 May 2016). Introducing this 
clause in the construction sector was not a random decision, as according to the 
European Builders Confederation's estimate, around 8% of French employees of 
the building construction sector lost their jobs between 2011 and 2014 due to the 
posting of foreign workers. European Builders Confederation, Press Release 
'Posting of Workers: European Small Construction Entrepreneurs Welcome 
Revision', 8 March 2016 available at: <http://www.ebc-construction.eu/fileadmin/ 
Pubblications/Press_releases/2016/2016_03_08_EBC_on_EC_PWD_revision_E
N.pdf> accessed 2 April 2017.  
47 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29) 8. 
48 Ibid 6. 
49 Dhéret and Ghimis (n 34). 
50 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29) 8. 
51 Ibid 13. 
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residual effect. This means that 'unequal wage treatment particularly affects 
workers posted from low- to high-wage countries'.52  
The Commission duly notes that this situation could be improved by the 
effective implementation of the 2014 Enforcement Directive53 due on 18 June 
2016,54 and by the envisaged revision of the Regulation on social security 
coordination.55 It also clearly establishes that the revision it envisages will not 
affect the Enforcement Directive or the measures adopted to transpose it. 
Rather 'it focuses on issues which were not addressed by it and pertain to the 
EU regulatory framework set by the original 1996 Directive. Therefore, the 
revised Posting of Workers Directive and the Enforcement Directive are 
complementary to each other and mutually reinforcing'.56 In the 
Commission's eyes, this argument justifies its action. 
Interestingly, right before the Commission published its proposal in March 
2016, the European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC), Businesseurope, 
the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(UEAPME) and the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises (CEEP) 
– i.e. both employer organisations and trade unions at the EU level – jointly 
regretted that the Commission did not comply with their request to organise 
a social partner consultation.57 This lack of consultation was later strongly 
criticised by parliaments as illustrated below (V). 
                                                 
52 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29) 14.  
53 Directive 2014/67/EU on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal 
Market Information System ('the IMI Regulation') [2014] OJ L159/57. 
54 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29) 8. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid 9. 
57 ETUC, Businesseurope, UEAPME and CEEP, Letter to President Juncker of 2 
March 2016, <https://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/document/files/02. 
03.16_letter_president_juncker_posting.pdf> accessed 2 April 2017; see also: 
ETUC, Press release, 'Posted workers – Revision must deliver equal pay – Lack of 
consultation 'big mistake'', 4 March 2016 <https://www.etuc.org/press/posted-
workers-revision-must-deliver-equal-pay-lack-consultation-big-mistake>  
accessed 2 April 2017. 
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2. Content of the Commission's Proposal 
The proposed Directive corresponds to President Juncker's promise to 
revise the legislation on posted workers to avoid social dumping made on 15 
July 2014 in his opening statement58 and reiterated in his State of the Union 
2015 speech.59 Despite the adoption of the Enforcement Directive in 2014, an 
acute need for a revision of Directive 96/71/CE was still there to turn Jean-
Claude Juncker's wish to ensure that 'the same work at the same place should 
be remunerated in the same manner'60 into reality.61 As identified by the 
Commission itself in the impact assessment, the currently observable wage 
differentiation is based on three mechanisms contained in the PWD. First, 
there is 'an in-built structural wage gap between posted and local workers'62 
as it defines strict criteria for the application of the salaries agreed in sectoral 
collective agreements and hence leaves the possibility for the statutory 
minimum wage established in the Member State in question to apply. 
Second, the PWD fails to clearly define what the minimum rate of pay is 
composed of, although case law and in particular the recent case Sähköalojen 
ammattiliitoo ry have provided some indications in this regard.  
It is true of course that Article 153(5) TFEU defines that '[t]he provisions of 
this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or 
the right to impose lock-outs'.63 Yet, this does not mean that the PWD 
cannot define any uniform criteria of application at all, especially as – and this 
is the third mechanism identified by the Commission – in Denmark and in 
                                                 
58 Jean-Claude Juncker, 'A new start for Europe', Opening statement in the European 
Parliament plenary session, 15 July 2015 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
SPEECH-14-567_en.htm> accessed 2 April 2017.  
59 Jean-Claude Juncker, 'State of the Union 2015' (European Commission, 9 
September 2015), 10 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en. 
pdf> accessed 2 April 2017. 
60 Juncker (n 58). 
61 See in this line the European Builders Confederation's call for a targeted review of 
the Directive in its letter to Commissioner Thyssen of 5 October 2015, 
<http://www.ebc-construction.eu/fileadmin/Policies/Social_Affairs/Posting_of_ 
workers/EBC_Open_Letter_to_Comm_Thyssen__Posting_of_workers__Octobe
r _2015.pdf> accessed 2 April 2017. 
62 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29), 11. 
63 Emphasis added. 
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Sweden minimum rates of pay are set by collective agreements applicable on 
their whole territory while still leaving ample margin for the conclusion of 
company-level agreements. In addition, Article 57 TFEU also sets out a 
principle of equality in the cross-border provision of services as it states that 
'[w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right of 
establishment, the person providing a service may, in order to do so, 
temporarily pursue his activity in the Member State where the service is 
provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own 
nationals'.64 
Further to this, in the impact assessment, the Commission highlights the 
difficulties resulting from the 'one-size-fits-all' approach adopted in the 
original PWD.65 These difficulties arise in the context of subcontracting, 
temporary agency workers, and intra-corporate posting, and are caused by 
the lack of a time limit for the posting of workers despite the fact that the 
Directive does consider posting as something that is limited in time. To 
tackle these issues, the proposed revision of the Directive foresees that after 
24 months the posted worker will be considered as working in the host 
Member State (preamble, 8). Additionally, in the new Article 2bis the 
proposal adds safeguards if a posted worker is replaced by another posted 
worker performing the same task. It is further requested that Member States 
publish the constituent elements of remuneration online, and it is established 
in which documents the terms and conditions of employment may be 
contained to serve as a benchmark (Article 3(1) amended). Note that the term 
'remuneration' has replaced 'minimum rates of pay' and that whereas 
previously only the construction sector was concerned, now all sectors of the 
economy are subjected to these rules, the transport sector being an 
exception. However, the definition of remuneration used in the proposed 
revision is still quite vague, as it deems remuneration to be  
all the elements of remuneration rendered mandatory by national law, 
regulation or administrative provision, collective agreement or arbitration 
awards which have been declared universally applicable and/or, in the 
absence of a system for declaring collective agreements or arbitration awards 
to be of universal application, other collective agreements or arbitration 
                                                 
64 Emphasis added. 
65 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29), 14f. 
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awards within the meaning of paragraph 8 second subparagraph [which 
defines the invocable collective agreements and arbitration awards], in the 
Member State to whose territory the worker is posted (Art. 3(1) amended). 
The provision regarding subcontracting, however, leaves the Member States 
ample margin, as it reads: 
If undertakings established in the territory of a Member State are obliged by 
law, regulation, administrative provision or collective agreement, to sub-
contract in the context of their contractual obligations only to undertakings 
that guarantee certain terms and conditions of employment covering 
remuneration, the Member State may, on a non-discriminatory and 
proportionate basis, provide that such undertakings shall be under the same 
obligation regarding subcontracts with undertakings referred to in Article 
1(1) [i.e. 'undertakings established in a Member State which, in the 
framework of the transnational provision of services, post workers […] to the 
territory of Member State'] posting workers to its territory [emphasis added] 
(paragraph 1a added).  
The use of the verb 'may' implies that Member States are under no obligation 
whatsoever to adopt norms in this sense. Temporary agency workers also see 
their status better defined and protected (paragraph 1b, added).  
As regards subsidiarity, the Commission's justification is particularly brief as 
it simply reads without any further justification: 'An amendment to an 
existing Directive can only be achieved by adopting a new Directive'.66 In 
fact, the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons was very 
critical of this lack of justification, as it concluded during its meeting held on 
13 April 2016: 'Of particular concern is the failure to offer any analysis of the 
proposal's compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. It is unacceptable to 
simply repeat the Commission's logic which, in this instance, amounts to the 
factual statement that EU legislation can only be amended through a further 
piece of EU legislation. This is not in itself a satisfactory subsidiarity 
justification'.67 Such criticism is indeed greatly justified. Admittedly, a 
directive can only be amended by a directive but this does not automatically 
mean that the objective set for the revision of said directive can automatically 
                                                 
66 European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a revision 
of the PWD, point 2.2. 
67 House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, Documents considered on 13 
April 2016, point 6 bis (emphasis added). 
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be achieved by this means only. In this regard, the impact assessment also 
fails to shed much light on the matter: despite being fairly detailed and 103 
pages long, the justification for the respect of the subsidiarity principle is 
quite succinct. The part dedicated to 'EU right to act' that includes the 
justification is a little more than one paragraph long, and the wording on 
subsidiarity is as follows:  
The Directive currently provides for a uniform and EU-wide regulative 
framework setting a hard core of protective rules of the host Member State 
which need to be applied to posted workers, irrespective of their substance. 
Therefore, in full respect of the principle of subsidiarity, the Member States 
and the social partners at the appropriate level remain responsible for 
establishing their labour legislation, organising wage-setting systems and 
determining the level of remuneration and its constituent elements, in 
accordance with national law and practices. The envisaged initiative does not 
change this approach. It thus respects the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and does not interfere with the competence of national authorities and 
social partners.68  
It is true that the posting of workers has a cross-border dimension and that 
Member States would not be able to regulate the issue on their own. The 
Commission correctly recalls that a directive already exists in this field and 
that it proves insufficient to prevent the current problems from developing. 
Against this background, a thorough justification may appear to be less 
urgently needed than in other cases. But it is nonetheless surprising that the 
Commission provided such a limited justification.69 First, the obligation to 
provide a detailed assessment is contained in Article 5 Protocol No. 2. 
Second, Advocate General Kokott recently issued a clear warning in this 
regard to the Commission in her opinion on the case C-547/14 Philip Morris 
Brands SARL: Although she did not find any breach of the subsidiarity 
principle, she very clearly stated that 'it is strongly advisable that in future the 
Union legislature avoids set formulas like the one contained in recital 60 in 
                                                 
68 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29), 19-20 (emphasis added). 
69 As rightly pointed out by Davor Jancic, this lack of justification would be sufficient 
for national parliaments to take the matter before the CJEU. National parliaments 
have in fact not used this possibility opened to them so far. Davor Jancic, 'EU Law's 
Grand Scheme on National Parliaments. The Third Yellow Card on Posted 
Workers and the Way Forward' in Davor Jancic (ed), National Parliaments After the 
Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis (Oxford University Press 2017) 304.  
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the preamble to the Directive and instead enhances the preamble to the EU 
measure in question with sufficiently substantial statements regarding the 
principle of subsidiarity which are tailored to the measures in question'.70 
And third, the question of justification was already an issue when the previous 
yellow cards were triggered and it could therefore be somewhat disappointing 
for national parliaments to realise that even after they had managed to reach 
the high threshold to trigger the EWS, the Commission not only maintained 
its proposal unchanged but it also failed to improve its respect of the duty of 
justifying EU action.  
Be this as it may, the proposal has been welcomed by many, particularly the 
ETUC, although it still considered it to be insufficient on the ground that, in 
some Member States, it excludes most sectoral collective agreements in 
addition to excluding all company-level agreements.71 Additionally, it 
regretted that trade unions were not given the right to collectively bargain for 
posted workers and that main contractors were not made jointly liable with 
their subcontractors with respect to terms and conditions of employment.72 
Also, another issue lies in the fact that the Directive foresees a maximum 
duration of 24 months, which ETUC deems to be too long, especially as the 
average duration of posting is four months at present.73 Even if these 
arguments are arguably well-founded, given the controversy the current 
proposal has already created, it is hard to imagine how a proposal could have 
been more protective of posted workers. Perhaps this step in the right 
direction, however small it is, should be praised, especially as it will provide 
greater clarity and represents an improvement in comparison to the current 
situation as resulting from the CJEU's case law. 
                                                 
70 Opinion of Adovcate General Kokott in Case C-547/14 Philip Morris Brands SARL 
EU:C:2015:853,  para 188.  
71 The European Trade Union Confederation's Press release, 'Posted workers 
revision – equal pay for some', published 8 March 2016 <https://www.etuc. 
org/press/posted-workers-revision-%E2%80%93-equal-pay-some> accessed 3 
April 2017.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid.  
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IV. DYNAMICS OF INTERPARLIAMENTARY COORDINATION FOR THE 
THIRD YELLOW CARD  
The European Commission presented the proposal for a revision of the 
PWD on 8 March 2016, which meant that the deadline for reasoned opinions 
was 10 May 2016. Before turning to the timing and sequence of the reasoned 
opinions adopted by national parliaments – leading to the gradual emergence 
of a 'regional block' of Central and Eastern European national parliaments –, 
it is important to briefly review the factors that have a positive influence on 
the likelihood of a national parliament to submit a reasoned opinion, as they 
have been identified in the literature on the role of national parliaments in 
the EWS. 
The EWS gives national parliaments a collective role and it was expected to 
enhance interparliamentary coordination which would be indispensable to 
reach the threshold for triggering a yellow card.74 The first assessments of the 
EWS identified the short time period of eight weeks, a lack of resources, and 
the division between majority and opposition parties in national parliaments 
as the main challenges, but more recent studies have shown that stronger 
political contestation over EU integration in national parliaments as well as 
salient or urgent draft legislative acts increase the likelihood of issuing a 
reasoned opinion.75 In the case of the PWD, the period for scrutiny and 
institutional capacity of a national parliament were identical to other 
legislative proposals, but national parliaments and national governments of 
Central and Eastern European countries agreed on subsidiarity concerns 
about the revision of the PWD. Thus, national parliaments did not turn 
against their governments, they expressed their support by adopting 
reasoned opinions. The salience of the issue is beyond doubt, as was shown 
                                                 
74 Philipp Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: 
Constitutional Theory and Empirical Reality (Routledge 2012), Ch 3 and Ch 7; Ben 
Crum, 'The EU as Multilevel Democracy: Conceptual and Practical Challenges', 
PADEMIA Online Papers on Parliamentary Democracy 4/2016, 15 <http://www. 
pademia.eu/publications/online-papers-on-parliamentary-democracy/online-
papers-on-parliamentary-demcoracy-iv2016/> accessed 3 April 2017. 
75 Katjana Gattermann and Claudia Hefftler, 'Beyond Institutional Capacity: 
Political Motivation and Parliamentary Behaviour in the Early Warning System' 
(2015) 38 West European Politics 305. 
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above. Finally, the interparliamentary coordination that helped to trigger the 
first and second yellow card76 also seems to have played a role in this case. 
To analyse the timing and sequencing of the reasoned opinions that 
ultimately triggered the third yellow card, it is necessary to recall that each 
national parliament has different procedures for adopting a reasoned 
opinion77 and that some of the parliaments that became active in the case of 
the PWD had only adopted very few reasoned opinions since 2010. In the 
run-up to 10 May 2016, however, a dynamic emerged that saw nine national 
parliaments/chambers adopt their reasoned opinions in the seven final days 
before the deadline.  
The first chamber to adopt a reasoned opinion, after the Commission had 
transmitted its revision proposal on 8 March, was the Czech Chamber of 
Deputies on 31 March. Its European Affairs Committee had decided on 17 
March to deliberate on the document and appointed a rapporteur.78 With its 
early decision and adoption of the reasoned opinion the Czech lower 
chamber was able to set the stage for further reasoned opinions. The Polish 
Sejm (13 April) and the Romanian Chamber of Deputies (also 13 April) 
followed. Similar to the two previous cases of yellow cards, the 'vote count' 
for expressing reasoned opinions stood at only three votes (out of the 19 votes 
required) about four weeks before the deadline. On 20 April the Bulgarian 
National Assembly adopted its reasoned opinion; the Czech Senate followed 
on 27 April. However, on 1 May reasoned opinions that would represent 13 
                                                 
76 Ian Cooper, 'A Yellow Card for the Striker: National Parliaments and the Defeat 
of EU Legislation on the Right to Strike' (2015) 22 Journal of European Public 
Policy 1406; Mette Buskjaer Christensen, 'The Danish Folketing and EU Affairs: 
Is the Danish Model of Parliamentary Scrutiny Still Best Practice?' in Claudia 
Hefftler et al (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European 
Union (Palgrave 2015) 283; Christine Neuhold and Anna-Lena Högenauer, 'An 
Information Network of Officials? Dissecting the Role and Nature of the Network 
of Parliamentary Representatives in the European Parliament' (2016) 22 The 
Journal of Legislative Studies 237, 251. 
77 All procedures are detailed on COSAC's website <http://www.cosac.eu/subsidia 
rity-control-in-nation/> accessed 2 April 2017.  
78 Information retrieved from the IPEX website: COD/2016/0070 – Czech Chamber 
of Deputies, <http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/scrutiny/COD20160070/czpos. 
do> accessed 2 April 2017. 
146 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 10 No. 1 
 
votes were still lacking to reach the 19-vote threshold for a yellow card by 10 
May. A series of reasoned opinions adopted by the Lithuanian Seimas (3 May), 
the Romanian Senate (3 May), the Danish Parliament (4 May), as well as three 
reasoned opinions on 5 May (by the Croatian Parliament, the Latvian Saeima 
and the Polish Senate) increased the number of votes to 16. On the final day, 
10 May, when there were still three votes lacking to activate the EWS, the 
unicameral parliaments of Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia (each of them with 
two votes) adopted reasoned opinions. The number of votes rose to 22 and 
the yellow card was triggered.  
13 out of 14 chambers that submitted reasoned opinions on the revision of the 
PWD came from Central and Eastern Europe. As suggested by Cooper, a 
yellow card should be taken as 'a kind of 'alarm bell' triggered in unusual 
circumstances'.79 It is noteworthy that ten out of these 14 chambers had 
submitted less than one reasoned opinion per year between 2010 and May 
2016.80 The fact that these national parliaments, generally not very active in 
the EWS, used this tool on this occasion shows that they have the capacity 
and willingness to use it if necessary. Furthermore, the sequence of the 
opinions' approval indicates a probable coordination in a 'regional block' of 
national parliaments that managed to establish closer coordination around 
one specific topic with shared preferences. In fact, given that their respective 
governments, with the exception of Croatia and Denmark, had submitted a 
joint letter to the Commission during the consultation phase (see details 
below), it is most likely that coordination of some sort also took place among 
these national parliaments.  
                                                 
79 Cooper (n 76). 
80 Their total numbers of reasoned opinions are the following: Bulgarian National 
Assembly: 4; Croatian Parliament: 1; Czech Chamber of Deputies: 4; Czech Senate: 
5; Estonian Parliament: 1; Hungarian National Assembly: 2; Latvian Parliament: 2; 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies: 6; Romania Senate: 3; Slovakian National 
Assembly: 6. Data retrieved from Agata Gostynska-Jakubowska, 'The Role of 
National Parliaments in the EU: Building or Stumbling Blocks?' (2016) Policy Brief, 
Centre for European Reform.  
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V. CONTENT OF THE REASONED OPINIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
SUBMITTED BY NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
Before embarking on the analysis of the reasoned opinions, it is interesting to 
note that in the preparation phase the Commission had conducted 
consultations abiding by its obligation contained in Article 10(3) TEU as well 
as in Article 2 Protocol No. 2. In this framework, 16 Member States expressed 
their views81 in the form of two letters: the first one sent on 18 June 2015 by 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Sweden and the second one on 31 August 2015 submitted by Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and 
Romania. Whereas the first letter was supportive of the modernisation of the 
PWD,82 the second letter considered that 'a review of the 1996 Directive 
[was] premature and should be postponed after the deadline for the 
transposition of the Enforcement Directive ha[d] elapsed and its effects 
carefully evaluated and assessed'.83 Except for Croatia and Denmark, the 
signatories of this letter are the same Member States whose parliaments 
adopted reasoned opinions.  
The proposal did not only attract the attention of these 14 national 
parliaments/chambers that submitted reasoned opinions, but another six84 
submitted mere contributions in the framework of the Political Dialogue, i.e. 
opinions that do not address the issue of subsidiarity and are forwarded to the 
Commission.85 Of course, as is usually the case, the parliaments/chambers 
                                                 
81 European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 29), 4.  
82 European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Revision 
of the PWD, SWD(2016)53 final, point 3.1. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Both French Chambers, the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the Portuguese 
Parliament, the Spanish Parliament and the UK House of Commons. It seems 
slightly surprising that neither of the German chambers issued any opinion given 
how deeply Germany is affected by the phenomenon of posted workers.  
85 Reasoned opinions and contributions available on the Platform for 
interparliamentary information exchange (IPEX): <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secre 
tariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/united_kingdom/2016_en.htm>, 
accessed 2 April 2017.  
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that submitted reasoned opinions also added other remarks not related to 
subsidiarity. 
For what concerns the parliaments/chambers that did find a subsidiarity 
breach, all of them (except Denmark) considered in some way that the 
Commission had violated its obligation contained in Article 5 Protocol No. 2 
to justify its action and especially its added value. Many considered that the 
EU should refrain from acting to reach the objectives set by this Directive, 
i.e. ending the existence of unfair practices and ensuring that the principle of 
equal pay for equal work applies. Instead, they suggested that time, 
development of the low-wage markets, and the possibilities of introducing 
more restrictive rules at national level would be sufficient to achieve these 
goals.  
National parliaments' reasoning on the lack of justification, as explained 
above, is perfectly in line with the principle as it is defined in the Treaty and 
its protocol and may indeed amount to a breach of its obligations by the 
Commission. Another argument that could potentially be acceptable is that 
related to the fact that the proposal intervenes prematurely (Czech Senate, 
Estonian Parliament, Latvian Parliament, Lithuanian Parliament, Romanian 
Chambers and Slovak National Council). As we recalled, the deadline for the 
transposition of the Enforcement Directive only expired on 18 June 2016, i.e. 
after the proposal for a revision of the PWD had been presented. It is true 
that the Commission explicitly declared both norms to be complementary 
and as not addressing the same issues. However, given the fact that the 
subsidiarity assessment indeed has an EU added-value dimension, the 
Commission's revision initiative might have been more convincing for 
reluctant parliaments if it had been possible to evaluate the effects of the 
Enforcement Directive. This raises the question as to why the Commission 
decided to make this proposal at this point in time. In this regard, three 
possible reasons can be formulated. First, the Brexit referendum was 
approaching and the question of migrant EU workers had played a very 
important role in the debates about the UK's EU membership. Second, the 
Juncker Commission had made a commitment to create a more social 
Europe. Third, as the number of posted workers has continued to grow 
sharply, it is likely that the Commission did not want to wait much longer to 
2017}  National Parliaments' Third Yellow Card 149 
 
 
launch the debate on a revision, especially given the fact that the adoption of 
the PWD had taken six years in the 1990s.  
Other arguments used by parliaments to substantiate the existence of a 
subsidiarity breach are, however, beyond the scope of the subsidiarity test. 
The Lithuanian Parliament for example declared in its reasoned opinion that 
'the legal regulation proposed might be contrary to the principle of 
subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5(3) of the Treaty of the European Union and 
Protocol No 2 on the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality by unreasonably restricting the opportunities and incentives for 
businesses to provide cross-border services, thus possibly working against consumers' 
interests'.86 Clearly, this assessment is not in line with what national 
parliaments are expected to assess, i.e. whether an objective cannot be 
sufficiently achieved at Member States' level while at the same time being 
better achieved at Union level. What this opinion appears to be doing is 
expressing criticism on the content of the proposal and its aim instead of an 
assessing the respect of the principle of subsidiarity. Similarly, the Romanian 
Chamber of Deputies concluded that 'the Directive proposal does not have 
enough added value and consequently, it decided that the principle of 
subsidiarity is infringed, mainly from the perspective of the usefulness of the 
regulation'.87 This opinion is based on the Commission's failure to introduce 
full clarity concerning the definition of what the remuneration entails and on 
the already existing possibility for Member States to impose stricter norms 
than those contained in the PWD. However, this argument is only partially 
related to subsidiarity. The lack of full clarification in the definition of 
remuneration is indeed likely to hamper the full attainment of the goal set for 
the revision but the possibility for Member States to introduce restrictions is 
not in line with subsidiarity because it amounts to calling into question the 
goal of the revision itself, i.e. whether a revision is needed at all in the first 
place. In other words, the EU's need to act is not questioned, what is doubted 
is whether it should take stronger action than at present or whether the status 
                                                 
86 Opinion issued by the Lithuanian Parliament on 20 April 2016, (emphasis added). 
Note also the use of the verb 'might' in relationship to the subsidiarity, also used in 
the concluding statement of this reasoned opinion. Of course, this opinion is a 
translation from Lithuanian, which triggered the use of an inappropriate verb, but 
this use of 'might' conveys some uncertainty in this Parliament's opinion.  
87 Opinion issued by the Romanian Chamber of Deputies on 13 April 2016. 
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quo in this field is best. In the same vein, many parliaments considered that 
the differences in labour costs are 'a legitimate element of companies' 
competitiveness in the EU internal market'.88 The Danish Parliament 
interestingly enough supported the Commission's initiative to foster the 
application of the principle of equal pay for equal work. Yet, it did still find a 
breach of subsidiarity since, in its opinion, some parts of the proposed 
revision cause lacks of clarity as to the remaining national competence in this 
field.89  
In sum, it appears that the reasoned opinions rightfully claimed that a breach 
of the principle of subsidiarity had occurred, but solely on the basis of 
procedural grounds. Actually, the Commission could easily have justified the 
proposal in an appropriate manner. Then it would have been impossible for 
parliaments to use the EWS for their political disagreement or, if they had 
still used the EWS for that (unlawful) purpose, the reasoned opinions would 
not have resisted a thorough legal assessment. 
Not all of the arguments unrelated to subsidiarity can be considered here. 
They were linked to the legal basis for example, i.e. whether it was still 
appropriate (Romanian Chamber of Deputies).90 Seven parliaments/ 
chambers further noted that the consultations carried out by the 
Commission were insufficient (Czech Senate, Hungarian Parliament, 
Latvian Parliament, Lithuanian Parliament, Romanian Chambers and Slovak 
National Council). This certainly amounts to a breach by the Commission of 
its obligations contained in Article 10(3) TEU and in Article 2 Protocol No. 2 
but it does not automatically amount to a breach of subsidiarity. This would 
only be the case if it could be proven beyond any doubt that the premises of 
the Commission's proposal were terribly inaccurate due to the absence of 
adequate consultation. The marginal importance of the phenomenon of the 
posting of workers and its consequent limited impact on the internal market 
was raised by the Latvian Parliament and the Romanian Chamber of 
Deputies.91 Admittedly this argument does hold. However, as indicated 
                                                 
88 Opinion issued by the Croatian Parliament on 6 May 2016.  
89 Opinion issued by the Danish Parliament on 6 May 2016. 
90 Romanian Chamber of Deputies (n 87). 
91 Romanian Chamber of Deputies (n 87), and opinion issued by the Latvian 
Parliament on 5 May 2016. 
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above, the numerical importance of this phenomenon is certainly 
underestimated. It has had additional consequences in certain sectors, e.g. in 
the Belgian and French construction sectors. Both arguments can certainly 
justify the Commission's action. 
In addition to these reasoned opinions, six parliaments/chambers also 
submitted contributions to the Commission in the framework of the 
Political Dialogue. Some of them did so within the eight-week period 
available for the control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity, 
whereas others, such as the House of Commons, did so after 10 May 2016.92 
It is noteworthy that some were clearly conceived as contributions in the 
framework of the Political Dialogue and labelled as such (French Senate) 
whereas others (French National Assembly and UK House of Commons) 
simply reused a document prepared at domestic level and forwarded it to the 
Commission (respectively a resolution and a letter between Committee 
chairs). The other contributions focused specifically on subsidiarity, finding 
that no breach had occurred, although they did occasionally touch upon 
other issues, too. Interestingly the Portuguese Parliament, despite being 
supportive of the Commission's initiative, noted that said initiative might 
have been tabled prematurely. 
VI. WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE AND WHAT CAN WE EXPECT NEXT? 
The European Commission replied to national parliaments' reasoned 
opinions on 20 July 2016, more than two months after the yellow card had 
been triggered. The time span corresponds to the period needed after the 
first yellow card, but is longer than it was for the second yellow card (three 
weeks). As the Commission maintained its proposal in its original form, the 
legislative process continues. Recent months have shown, however, that the 
split between East and West, between 'old' and 'new' Member States, has not 
only divided parliaments and led to the emergence of a regional block of 
reasoned opinions from national parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe 
(plus Denmark), but also that the East-West split has divided government 
representatives in the Council and even Members of the European 
Parliament. 
                                                 
92 Opinion issued by the UK House of Commons on 25 May 2016. 
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1. The Response of the European Commission to the Yellow Card 
In its Communication of 20 July 2016 (hereinafter: Communication),93 the 
Commission justified its proposal, rejected the subsidiarity concerns and 
other concerns raised by national parliaments, and announced that the 
revision of the Directive was still going to be pursued: a withdrawal or an 
amendment was not required.94 The Communication only addressed the 
arguments related to the principle of subsidiarity in line with Article 6 of 
Protocol No 2. Other arguments were addressed in the Commission's 
individual replies to national parliaments, as in the case of the second yellow 
card.95 
Regarding the argument by several national parliaments that the current 
Directive was sufficient and adequate as it gives Member States the 
possibility to go beyond the general rules, the Commission stated that only 
an obligation, but not the option, to apply such rules in sectors other than the 
construction sector allows to fully achieve the objective 'to provide a more 
level playing field between national and cross-border service providers and to 
ensure that workers carrying out work at the same location are protected by 
the same mandatory rules'.96 In contrast to what eight parliamentary 
chambers argued, the objective of revising the Directive was not to align 
wages across Member States, but to ensure that 'mandatory rules on 
remuneration in the host Member State are applicable also to workers posted 
to that Member State'.97 
With respect to concerns (by all national parliaments except the Danish 
Parliament) that the adequate level of action was not the Union level, but the 
Member State level, or that it had not been sufficiently proven why the aim 
                                                 
93 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
and the National Parliaments on the proposal for a Directive amending the Posting 
of Workers Directive, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance 
with Protocol No 2 of 20 July 2016, COM(2016) 505 final. 
94 Ibid 9. 
95 All these replies are available on the Commission's website: <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm> accessed 2 
April 2017. 
96 Communication (n 93) 6. 
97 Ibid. 
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of the revision should be achieved at the Union level, the Commission 
responded that national actions 'could lead to a fragmentation of the Internal 
Market as regards the freedom to provide services'.98 It referred to the 
'inherent cross-border nature of the posting of workers'99, the facilitation of 
exercising the rights enshrined in Article 57 TFEU, and difficulties in 
bringing legal consistency throughout the Internal Market by individual 
actions of Member States. 
The Commission continued with the comment made by the Danish 
Parliament that the proposal failed to make an explicit reference to Member 
States' competences on remuneration and conditions of employment. 
According to the Commission, the proposal merely provided that rules, as set 
by Member States, 'should apply in a non-discriminatory manner to local and 
cross-border service providers and to local and posted workers'.100 The 
provision that 'cross-border temporary agency workers are given the same 
rights as […] national temporary agency workers'101 was also adequate and 
would leave the competence of each Member State to determine these rights 
intact. 
Finally, concerning the argument that the justification in the proposal with 
regard to the subsidiarity principle was 'too succinct' and failed to comply 
with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaty (raised in a total of nine reasoned 
opinions), the Communication cites the case law of the CJEU with case C-
233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council,102 accepting 'an implicit and rather 
limited reasoning as sufficient to justify compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity'103, and more recently case C-547/14 Philip Morris,104 demanding 
an evaluation 'not only by reference to the wording of the contested act, but 
also by reference to its context and the circumstances of the individual 
case'.105 The Commission acknowledged that the phrase in the explanatory 
memorandum '[a]n amendment to an existing Directive can only be achieved 
                                                 
98 Communication (n 93) 7. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid 8. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council EU:C:1997:231.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Case C-547/14 Philip Morris EU:C:2016:325.  
105 Ibid. 
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by adopting a new Directive'106 was succinct, but also referred to the recitals 
of the draft Directive and the Impact Assessment Report and considered 
that 'that information is sufficient to allow both the Union legislature and 
national Parliaments to determine whether the draft legislative act at issue 
complies with the principle of subsidiarity'.107  
The Commission promised that it would 'pursue its political dialogue with all 
national Parliaments' and that it was 'ready to engage in discussions with the 
European Parliament and the Council in order to adopt the proposed 
directive.'108 Here, the difference with the second yellow card is noteworthy: 
At the time, it had promised that 'during the legislative process the 
Commission will […] take due account of the reasoned opinions'.109 
2. The On-Going Legislative Process and the East-West Divide 
Legislative work on the revision of the Directive has continued. The dossier 
falls under the ordinary legislative procedure. To enter into force, the revision 
of the Directive will therefore need the support of a majority in the European 
Parliament and of a qualified majority in the Council. Although national 
parliaments/chambers from eleven Member States issued a yellow card and 
the European Commission decided to still pursue the revision of the 
Directive, the dialogue between the European Parliament, the Commission 
and national parliaments from all 28 Member States has continued: on 12 
October 2016 the Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the 
                                                 
106 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, amending Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services, COM(2016) 128 final, Explanatory 
Memorandum, point 2.2. 
107 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
and the National Parliaments on the proposal for a Directive amending the Posting 
of Workers Directive, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity COM(2016) 505 
final, 9. 
108 Ibid 9-10. 
109 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
and the National Parliaments on the review of the proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office with 
regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol No 2 of 27 
November 2013, COM(2013) 851 final. 
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European Parliament (EMPL) organised an interparliamentary committee 
meeting on the draft revision of the PWD.110 Such an involvement of national 
parliaments' sectoral committees is particularly welcome as the experts on 
specific policies are better able to discuss detailed questions related to 
legislative dossiers than members of European affairs committees of national 
parliaments who generally deal with a wide range of policies.111 The co-
rapporteurs of the European Parliament welcomed the meeting 'as an 
opportunity to learn more about the views from across Member States, as 
well as a forum to share information', but they also stressed that 'it was 
important […] not to focus on the Reasoned Opinions and the arguments 
behind them.'112 Commissioner Thyssen took part in the meeting and the 
exchange of views with and between national Members of Parliament and 
MEPs heard comments from both those in favour and those against the 
proposal. Another discussion between Commissioner Thyssen and European 
affairs committees of national parliaments had taken place at the COSAC 
chairpersons' meeting in Bratislava on 11 July 2016,113 before the European 
Commission adopted its response to the yellow card. With respect to the 
overall progress on the dossier, the Commissioner acknowledged in 
December 2016 that it 'has slowly trudged through negotiations'114. The vote 
of the European Parliament's draft report, for example, will probably take 
place in the EMPL committee in July 2017. The decision by the Legal affairs 
                                                 
110 Posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (European 
Parliament, 11 November 2016), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/ 
empl/events-other.html?id=20161012CHE00091> accessed 10 April 2017. 
111 Diane Fromage, 'Increasing Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation in the European 
Union: Current Trends and Challenges' (2016) 22 European Public Law 749.  
112 Brussels Bulletin No 519: 14 October 2016, 10, <https://www.parliament.uk/ 
documents/commons-committees/european-scrutiny/Brussels-Bulletin/519-14-
October-2016.pdf> accessed 11 September 2017. 
113 Marianne Thyssen, Speech on the social dimension of the European Union at the 
Meeting of National Parliaments (COSAC), (European Commission, 11 July 2016) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/thyssen/announcements/ 
speech-social-dimension-european-union-meeting-national-parliaments-cosac-
bratislava_en> accessed 2 April 2017. 
114 Catherine Stupp, 'Thyssen proposes rules to fight 'populist' charges of welfare 
tourism', (Euractiv.com, 13 December 2016), <https://www.euractiv.com/section/ 
social-europe-jobs/news/thyssen-proposes-rules-to-fight-populist-charges-of-
welfare-tourism/> accessed 2 April 2017. 
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committee to give the directive a double legal basis by adding a social 
dimension to it might delay the negotiations even further. 
In any case, negotiations promise to be tough as the opposition from Central 
and Eastern European Member States that triggered the third yellow card is 
not limited to their national parliaments. Central and Eastern European 
governments in the Council and many MEPs from these countries also reject 
the Commission's proposal. The 'regional block' against the revision of the 
PWD transcends the levels of the EU's multi-level system and the boundaries 
between the different institutions. At the same time, many 'old' Member 
States are pushing hard for changes: Employment ministers from Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden have 
publicly called for an ambitious reform of the current Directive.115 This means 
that a real split between East and West, between 'old' and 'new' Member 
States, threatens the consensus-oriented political system of the EU. 
Under the surface, the split indicates the opposition between those who are 
in favour of more EU regulation (to protect workers, often from Central and 
Eastern Europe who are posted to 'old' Member States, and to avoid social 
dumping) and those who are against tighter EU regulation in this area. In the 
case of posted workers, trade unions belong to the former group and 
employer associations belong to the latter group. While such divisions have 
often been observed in the process of European integration, it is striking to 
see that in this case the left-right cleavage exists, but some political actors 
seem to take their positions according to nationality (rather than to their 
affiliation to Pan-European political parties), including in the European 
Parliament, while other actors have aligned themselves along the 'capital 
versus worker' dimension.116 
                                                 
115 'Travailleurs détachés : « La liberté de circuler ne doit pas être celle d'exploiter »' Le 
Monde, 12 December 2016, <http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/12/12/la-
liberte-de-circuler-ne-doit-pas-etre-celle-d-exploiter_5047228_3232.html#1Gwb 
0kzAaifuVeBv.99> accessed 2 April 2017. 
116 Simon Hix, Abdul G Noury and Gérard Roland, Democratic Politics in the European 
Parliament (Cambridge University Press 2007) 180f; Alexander Somek, 'From 
Workers to Migrants, from Distributive Justice to Inclusion: Exploring the 
Changing Social Democratic Imagination' (2012) 18 European Law Journal, 711.  
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Irrespective of what the reasons are, the current conflict line is clear and 
despite promises to find a compromise,117 it seems difficult to reconcile the 
different positions. The Juncker Commission is committed to a more 'social' 
Europe and sees itself as a 'political' Commission that pushes its policy 
priorities. In his State of the Union speech of September 2016, Jean-Claude 
Juncker emphasised that '[w]orkers should get the same pay for the same 
work in the same place. Europe is not the Wild West, but a social market 
economy.'118  
One would therefore currently assume that the 11 Member States whose 
national parliaments objected to the revision of the PWD by issuing 
reasoned opinions will also oppose the proposal in the Council and vote 
against it. However, they do not carry enough weight to stop it: if these 11 
Member States vote against it (and all other 17 Member States in favour of the 
proposal), the 'double majority' will be reached, as more than 55% (16) of the 
EU's Member States representing 79.1% of the population (requirement: 
65%) will have voted for the revision of the Directive. Only under the 
transitional provision of Protocol No 36 annexed to the EU Treaties, Title 
II, Article 3(2), according to which between 1 November 2014 and 31 March 
2017 a member of the Council may request to calculate the majority following 
the (old) voting rules of the Treaty of Nice, the situation would have been 
different: The proposal would not reach the necessary 260 votes, but only 241 
votes (if we assume 111 votes against it – constituting a blocking majority of 
weighted votes in the Council).119 The proposal, however, had not been tabled 
and voted in the Council before 31 March 2017 as it proved impossible to 
reach a political agreement in the Council.120 The proposal has also been 
                                                 
117 Cécile Barbière, 'Le Parlement veut réconcilier l'Est et l'Ouest sur les travailleurs 
détachés' (Euractiv.fr, 1 December 2016) <http://www.euractiv.fr/section/europe-
sociale-emploi/news/le-parlement-veut-reconcilier-lest-et-ouest-sur-les-
travailleurs-detaches/> accessed 2 April 2017. 
118 Jean-Claude Juncker, 'The State of the Union 2016' (European Commission, 14 
September 2016), <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3042_en.htm> 
accessed 2 April 2017.  
119 All calculations were made in January 2017 using the Voting Calculator of the 
Council of the European Union, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-
eu/voting-system/voting-calculator/> accessed 6 January 2017. 
120 Catherine Stupp, 'Divides deepen between member states over posted workers bill' 
(Euractiv.com, 24 March 2017), <http://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-
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subject to parliamentary scrutiny reserves expressed by several national 
parliaments.121  
The Member States that objected to the proposal when their parliaments 
submitted reasoned opinions will be unable to stop it in the Council. The 
same applies to MEPs from these countries in the European Parliament 
where the institutional position is usually determined by the two major 
political groups EPP and S&D, which support the proposal. It would be even 
more difficult for the opponents of the revision of the Posted Workers 
Directive to mobilise enough MEPs to block it.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
At this stage, the success of the reform of the Posted Workers Directive is 
uncertain. Whether it will be possible to bridge diverging preferences, in 
particular between France and Poland, remains unclear, despite the 
European Parliament's efforts searching for a compromise. Perhaps this 
reform will also take several years, as was the case for the PWD itself: The 
Commission presented its proposal in 1991 and it was finally adopted in 
1996.122 What is beyond any doubt however, as the preceding analysis has 
shown, is the fact that the current deadlock was not provoked by the third 
yellow card; it merely revealed conflicting positions among Member States 
and made them more visible. The EWS and the possibility for national 
parliaments to issue reasoned opinions served as the vehicle for Central and 
Eastern European Member States to express opposition beyond mere 
subsidiarity concerns.  
If we compare this third yellow card with the two previous ones, the key 
difference is this 'regional block'. The Juncker Commission's attitude and 
response were different, but not as different as one would have expected if 
one considers the rhetoric Jean-Claude Juncker used at the start of its term 
in 2014 when he promised to 'forge a new partnership' with national 
                                                 
jobs/news/divides-deepen-between-member-states-over-posted-workers-bill/>, 
accessed 2 April 2017.  
121 Harry Cooper, 'Worker protection rules trigger East-West battle' POLITICO 
Europe, 14 December 2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/worker-protection-
rules-trigger-east-west-battle/> accessed 2 April 2017. 
122 On this adoption procedure: Zahn (n 38) 2-3.  
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parliaments. If this pledge had been taken seriously, the justification 
regarding subsidiarity could have been expected to be in line with the 
obligation contained in Article 5 Protocol No. 2. Nevertheless, the Juncker 
Commission followed the 'good practice' that the Barroso Commission had 
established when it wrote individual replies to national parliaments regarding 
the second yellow card.  
With respect to the overall role of national parliaments in the European 
Union, the question arises whether the EWS can be considered an efficient 
tool. Seven years after the Lisbon Treaty put it in place, the three yellow cards 
triggered so far are not in themselves a sign of the system's efficiency or 
inefficiency. National parliaments are dedicating significant time and 
resources to a procedure that has not yet had any direct impact: They have 
only reached the threshold three times and the Commission either retracted 
its proposal for other reasons (Monti II) or carried on its legislative initiative 
(EPPO, PWD). This has led to proposals to introduce a 'red card' in whose 
framework national parliaments could block legislation and bypass the 
Commission, possibly even beyond subsidiarity.123 What should not be 
underestimated however, is the indirect effect of the EWS: The Commission 
has started to adapt incrementally and the Juncker Commission's focus on 
priority dossiers that 'make a difference' is a sign of this change, as is the 
improvement in the replies that it provides to national parliaments.124 
Taking a broader perspective, EU policy makers must take into account that 
many national parliaments wish to have policy influence.125 They used a 
provision that merely provides for subsidiarity control to try and change the 
content of the proposed revision of the PWD. Whether this effort will be 
                                                 
123 Even though the agreement (European Council, Draft Decision of the Heads of 
State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a New 
Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union. EUCO 4/16 
[Section C]) has now become obsolete since on 23 June 2016 the British referendum 
saw a majority vote to leave the EU, the topic has not disappeared from the political 
agenda. The 'red card' was mentioned for instance in a background note for the 
COSAC plenary in November 2016 that had been prepared by the Slovak 
Presidency Parliament. 
124 COSAC, 26th bi-annual report, 23 <http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-
reports-of-cosac/> accessed 2 April 2017.  
125 See also Jancic (n 69) 306. 
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successful remains to be seen. What this third yellow card has highlighted, is 
the deep division when it comes to the objective to create a 'Social Europe'. 
While this featured prominently in Jean-Claude Juncker's manifesto and is 
shared by citizens in Western European Member States, many Central and 
Eastern Europeans do not perceive this as necessary and largely see it as an 
attempt at protectionism. The struggle about the revision of the Posted 
Workers Directive has emerged for exactly these reasons and is far from over 
yet.
